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ABSTRACT

This study examined children's spontaneous integration of

seraantically relevant pictures and sentences by manipulating
levels of processing.

In Experiment 1, 48 third graders v/ere

presented a series of 24 pictures and sentences, follov/ed by

24 intervening items at a presentation rate of 15 seconds per
slide.

Each intervening item contained either semantically

relevant or irrelevant information in the opposite modality

of the original item it corresponded to.

Subjects were given

either shallov/, deep, or intentional processing instructions.
In Experiment 2, 16 third graders v/ere presented the same

material as in Experiment 1, with intentional instructions,
but at a rate of 8 seconds per slide.

In a same-different

recognition test, the results suggested that cross-modality
semantic integration occurred spontaneously v/hen given a
viewing time of 15 seconds per slide in all of the depth of
processing tasks, but not when given a viewing time of 8
seconds per slide in the intentional condition.

These

findings are discussed in terms of the differences in memory
processing time with children and adults.
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INTRODUCTION

Semantic integration refers to the process in memory
wherein information that is similar in meaning contributes to
the same memory representation and is consequently stored
together in memory.

This process involves the active

interpretation and assimilation of meaningful relationships
within existing cognitive structures.

Semantic integration

is not achieved by means of a conscious effort on the part of
the individual.

Instead, semantic integration occurs

spontaneously due to the nature of memory.

Through the

process of semantic integration, one improves comprehension

and memory for the ideas being communicated by accumulating a
holistic representation instead of exclusive disconnected

units in memory.

For example, comprehension and memory of

verbal material appears to involve the spontaneous
construction and integration of both unambiguous and inferred

semantic relationships (Barclay, 1973).
The study of semantic integration of linguistic material
has been an area of growing interest.

Several studies have

reported that adults spontaneously adopt the process of

semantic integration in remembering sentences (Barclay, 1973;
Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Bransford & Franks, 1971;
Harris, 1974; Honeck, 1973).

Furthermore, Walsh and Baldwin

(1977), utilizing the Bransford and Franks (1971) paradigm,
replicated the Bransford and Franks linguistic abstraction

phenomenon with both young adults and elderly subjects.
Further evidence supporting the supposition that adults
semantically integrate verbal material is found in the

research conducted by Potts (1977), indicating that adults
integrate linear syllogisms.

Finally, adults have also been

found to integrate information contained in prose passages

(Bransford & McCarrell, 1975).
Children have also been found to make spontaneous
assumptions regarding inferred relationships in verbal
material.

Children often fail to distinguish between the

information generated from these assumptions and the
information that was actually presented.

Studies have found

that children demonstrate the ability to implicitly and

actively acquire, construct, and retain semantic information

implied within independent sentences (Paris & Carter, 1973;
Paris & Mahoney, 1974).

There is also evidence that suggests

that the process of semantic integration is involved in
children's reconstruction of short narrative sequences.

Brown (1976) presented preschool to fourth grade subjects
four pictures in a story v/hich viere accompanied v/ith either
complete narrative sentences, partial narrative sentences, or
no narrative sentences.

The subjects were then required to

reconstruct the sequence by selecting old items from a set
containing actually seen events and tv/o types of new items.

those consistent or inconsistent v/ith the ordered sequence of
the story.

The findings indicated that all the subjects had

difficulty distinguishing ne\>/-consistent items from actually
experienced old items.

Similarly, semantic integration is

evident in children's recall of prose passages (Barclay &
Reid, 1974).
V/hile the majority of studies have looked at semantic
integration as it occurs when dealing v/ith verbal material,
some studies have examined the process of semantic inte

gration of pictorial material.

The studies v/hich have been

conducted in this area have shov/n that both children and

adults retain the meaning of the pictorial stimuli in an

integrated, unified representation in memory rather than a

series of discrete pictures (Brov/n, 1976; Paris & Mahoney,
1974; Fezdek, 1978).
Several studies have dealt with semantic integration
within a single modality - either verbal or pictorial.
However, the present study is concerned with examining the
process of cross-modality semantic integration.

In essence,

this study is interested in determining if semantic,inte
gration occurs when third graders are presented information
in both verbal and pictorial modalities.

Hypothesizing that cross-modality semantic integration
occurs disputes the dual-coding hypothesis v/hich states that
information is represented in memory in either a verbal or

imaginal memory store (of. Paivio & Csapo, 1969).

These

two memory stores, or coding systems, are said to interact.
However, they are distinct memory stores with different means

af processing information and they retain different forms in
memory.

Thus, if one adheres to the dual-coding hypothesis,

cross-modality semantic integration v/ould be precluded due to
the fact that verbal and pictorial material are retained in
separate memiory stores depending upon the modality of the
information.

The concept of semantic integration is based on

the premise that pictorial and verbal material are encoded

and retained in a common memory store.

Therefore, the concept

of semantic integration contradicts the basic premise of the
dual-coding hypothesis.

Furthermore, research in this area

has led several investigators to conclude that the evidence
from available research is not adequate to support the dual-

coding hypothesis.

Several researchers suggest that verbal

and imaginal stimuli are retained in a common memory store

(Goldstein & Chance, 1974; Rosinski, 1977; Standing & Smith,
1975).

Utilizing the Bransford and Franks (1971) paradigm,
Rosenberg and Simon (1977) demonstrated that adults integrate
information across pictorial and verbal modalities into a

single underlying semantic representation.

This study

utilized four idea sets and instructed subjects to learn

pictures and sentences shown to them.

V/hen subjects were

given a recognition test, they were often confused as to
v/hether they had seen a picture or a sentence which expressed

the same meaning as those presented earlier.

Furthermore,

the more complex the sentence or picture was, the more likely
the subjects were to accept the items.

Pezdek (1977) found

similar results utilizing a different paradigm.

Adults were

presented with a series of slides depicting specific scenes
in both the pictorial and verbal modalities and v/ere told it

v/as important to comprehend the meaning of each item presented,
These slides were later followed by intervening items which
contained either semantically relevant or irrelevant

information in the opposite modality of the previously shown
slides.

For example, either a single picture was later

followed by a sentence as the intervening item, or a sentence

was later follov/ed by a picture as the intervening item.

The

test items were in the same modality as the original items.

The test items were either an integration of the original
and intervening items or it was identical to the original
items.

The obtained value of d' was lov/er when there v/as a

semantically relevant intervening item, relative to the

effects of a semantically irrelevant intervening item.

These

results indicate that adults semantically integrate

information contained in pictures and sentences.

This

paradigm has also been used to assess life-span developmental

differences in cross-modality semantic integration (Pezdek,
Note 1).

Results of this study indicate that sixth graders

and high school seniors semantically integrate information
contained in pictures and sentences while third graders and

elderly adults do not integrate the information.
The main objective of the present study is to determine

\7hy the third graders in Pezdek's (Note 1) study did not
semantically integrate across modalities.

Basically, the

absence of cross-modality integration by children could be

explained in terms of a mediational deficiency or a production
deficiency.

A subject is thought to have a mediational

deficiency v;hen he is unable to efficiently utilize a

potential mediator or strategy even when he is specifically
instructed to do so.

On the other hand, a production

deficiency is implicated when the subject can be induced,
through instructions or training, to use a mediator which he
did not produce spontaneously.

Some research findings are available' to possibly account

for the life-span differences reported by Pezdek (Note 1).
One study has shown that, when presented with sentences to
remember, children betv/een 5 and 7 years Old v/ere unable to
use implicit relationships to access sentence memory, vmile
children betv/een 11 and 12 years old v/ere able to use

inferred relationships to access sentence memory (Paris &
Lindauer, 1976).

Flavell, Beach, and Chinsky (1966)

reported that children between 5 and 7 years old were unlikely

to use spontaneous verbal rehearsal after they viev/ed objects
v/hich they had to recall.

However, 10 year olds in this

study did use a spontaneous verbal rehearsal strategy.
V/hile the above-mentioned studies clearly indicate a

deficiency of some type in young children, they do not shed

any light on the precise nature of the deficiency.

In other

words, these studies do not indicate \'/hether these children

have a mediational deficiency or a production deficiency.
However, there are several studies, when looked at in
conjunction with the above studies, that suggest young
children have a production deficiency rather than a
mediational deficiency.
Studies which have experimentally induced the use of
mediational strategies in children have been found to

significantly increase their memory for objects viewed
during the presentation phase of the experiments.

Levin,

Davidson, Wolff, and Citron (1973) shov/ed that second graders
and fifth graders perform significantly better on a pairedassociate task when given visual imagery instructions in
comparison to the regular study-test instructions generally

given in paired-associate tasks.

IJelson and Kosslyn (1976)

reported that by providing verbal labels for pictures during
the presentation phase, picture memory v/as enhanced more for
5 year olds than for adults.

Furthermore, it was shov/n that

when 8 year olds v/ere given imagery instructions, their
memory for concrete details of a short story v/as facilitated
more than those who did not receive imagery instructions

(Pressley, 1976).

Similarly, Levin (1973) found that imagery

instructions facilitated memory for details in a prose passage
in fourth graders v/ho had adequate reading skills but needed
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an organizational strategy.

Collectively, these studies indicate that young children
do not spontaneously adopt effective mnemonic strategies.
It appears that spontaneous instigation of a mnemonic

strategy for memorization, as a goal in itself, is not
characteristic of the young child (Brovm, 1975).

Flavell

(1970) has pointed out that the development of mnemonic
mediational activity is partly a function of a child's

ability to determine v/hich activity is effective for a given
task.

Based on the above findings, it appears that young

children may attempt to mediate learning, but the mnemonic

strategy selected is simply not adequate for the particular
task.

Many other researchers have also concluded that

children have a production deficiency (Hagen, Jongev/ard, &
Kail, 1975; Kausler, 1970; Smirnov & Zinchenko, 1969).
Further evidence to support the hypothesis that young

children have a production deficiency is substantiated by
research utilizing the depth of processing framev;ork proposed
by Craik and Loclchart (1972).

Essentially, Craik and Look-

hart (1972) suggest that the memory trace is a by-product of
perceptual analysis and that trace persistence is a positive

function of the depth to which the stimulus is analyzed.

It

should be noted that "depth" implies a greater degree of
cognitive or semantic analysis.

Several studies have shov/n

that young children benefit from deep processing tasks in

incidental learning situations (Eysenck, 1974; Murphy & Brown,

1975; Sykes, 1976; Weiss, Robinson, & Kastie, 1977).

This is

due to the fact that subjects are engaged in a task v/hich

requires a greater degree of semantic analysis v/ithout being
consciously av/are of the fact that the experiment v/ill test

their memorjr for objects viewed during the initial presentation.
Thus, they are unknov/ingly using an appropriate mediational
strategy for the task at hand, and in these instances, there
is no evidence that indicates the children are unable to use

these mediational strategies efficiently.

Therefore, this study was designed to determine if a

production deficiency in young children v/as responsible for

the results obtained by Pezdek (Note 1) in her cross-modality
semantic integration paradigm.

The present study utilized

Pezdek's cross-modality semantic integration paradigm.

However, an incidental learning situation was included in
addition to an intentional learning situation and levels of.

processing v/as manipulated as an independent variable.

This

is due to the fact that it v/as the strategy utilized by the

subject to encode the information in memory that v/as
important for this study.
Third graders were randomly assigned to either a shallow

processing condition v/hich involved a counting task, a deep
processing condition v/hich involved an imagery-induced

pleasantness-rating task, or an intentional condition which
required subjects to remember the material presented to them.
The subjects viev/ed a presentation of 48 slides.

The first
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24 slides v/ere considered the original items and consisted of
12 line-drav/ings and 12 sentences.

The next 24 slides \'/ere

either semantically relevant or irrelevant intervening items,
each presented in the opposite modality of the original
slides they corresponded to.

These slides v/ere presented

sequentially for 15 seconds each.

The test items consisted

of 24 slides, 12 of v/hich v/ere the original items shov/n and
12 of v/hich were an integration of the original item and its
corresponding intervening item.

The subjects had to decide

whether or not they had previously seen each test item.

If cross-modality semantic integration occurs, then
subjects should have difficulty in recognizing an original
test item when a semantically relevant item intervened.

Hov/ever, the subjects should be more likely to recognize an
original test item when a semantically irrelevant item

intervened than when a relevant item intervened.

The signal,

detection measure of d' indicates the change in recognition
sensitivity in differentiating between original items and
changed test items.

If subjects integrated the original-

items with the semantically relevant intervening items, they
should be less likely to discriminate the original items from

the altered test items.

Therefore, if semantic integration

occurs, the value of d' should be lower v/hen semantically
relevant items intervene than when semantically irrelevant
items intervene.

The issue of most direct interest in the present study is
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hovi recognition sensitivity (d') changes as a function of

encoding instructions.

It is hypothesized that the young

children in Pezdek's (Note 1) study had a production
deficiency/; integration did not occur because the subjects
v/ere not processing the infornation at a deep enough level to
be aware of the semantic similarity between items, despite
their formal differences in modality.

Based upon this

hypothesis, the present study predicts that, in terms of

depth of processing, third graders should semantically
integrate significantly more information v/ith the deep
processing task than with the shallow processing task.

This

is due to the fact that the subjects in the deep processing
condition are semantically processing the items more than the

subjects in the shallow processing condition.

Furthermore,

no evidence of semantic integration should be seen in the

intentional condition since third graders in Pezdek's (Mote 1)

study v/ere given the same instructions and failed to integrate
the information presented to them.

EXPERIMENT 1

METHOD

Subjects

Forty-eight third graders from Preston Elementary School,
Rialto, California and Monterey Elementary School, San
Bernardino, California participated in this experiment.
Students enrolled in remedial reading classes did not
participate.

Materials

The presentation slides consisted of 12 basic sets of
pictorial material and 12 basic sets of verbal material.
Each set contained t\vo presentation items and a test item.

In the pictorial categori'-, the original item of a set v/as

alv/ays a picture (P^), v/hile the intervening item v/as alv/ays
a sentence.

This intervening item v/as either a semantically

relevant sentence (RS) or semantically irrelevant sentence

(IS).

The test items in the pictorial category v/ere alv/ays

pictures.

On half of the trials the test item v/as the

original item (P^) presented, v/hile on the other half of the
trials the test item v/as an altered version of the original

item (P^). All of the pictures v/ere simple black-and-v/hite
line-dra\'/ings.

The original picture in the set depicted a
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general scene.

The relevant intervening sentence described

the original picture and also highlighted a particular detail
v/hich was either a novel detail in the original picture or
else an altered old detail in the original item.

The only-

difference betv/een the original test item (P^) and the

changed test item (P^) v/as that the changed test item
included the highlighted detail from the relevant intervening
sentence.

In the verbal category, the initial item was always a

sentence (S^) and the intervening item was always a relevant
picture (RP) or irrelevant picture (IP).

The test items in

the verbal category v/ere always sentences.

On half of the

trials the test item was the original sentence (S^), v/hile on
the other half of the trials the test item was an altered

version of the original sentence (S^). All sentences had
similar grammatical structure.

The original sentence in the

set described a general scene.

The relevant intervening

picture depicted the scene described in the original sentence
and added a specific detail to the scene.

V/hile the original

test item (S^) was identical to the original sentence, the
changed test item (S^) combined the information contained in
the original sentence v/ith the information depicted in the
intervening picture.
The control condition consisted of six verbal sets

containing irrelevant intervening pictures depicting a
concrete scene and six pictorial sets containing irrelevant
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intervening sentences describing a concrete scene.

These

intervening items v/ere semantically unrelated to the original
items.

The material contained in the irrelevant items did

not overlap v/ith the other items in the presentation.

Design

Each subject v/as presented both pictorial and verbal

stimuli, relevant and irrelevant intervening items, and both
original and altered test items.

Half of the items in both

the verbal and pictorial categories were randomly assigned to

the relevant intervening condition v\fhile the remaining items
v/ere assigned to the irrelevant intervening condition.

Half

of the pictorial and verbal items assigned to the relevant

intervening condition were randomly assigned to be tested

with the original test items v/hile the remaining items were
assigned to be tested v/ith the changed test items.

This

identical process was carried out for the material assigned
to the irrelevant intervening condition.

One-third of the subjects v/ere randomly assigned to the
shallov/ processing condition, one-third were randomly assigned

to the deep processing condition, and the remaining subjects
v/ere assigned to the intentional condition.

Furthermore, the

slides were randomly ordex'ed to produce tv/o different orders

of presentation, with the stipulation that no more than three
pictures or sentences v/ere presented consecutively.

Half of

the subjects from each instructional condition v/ere randomly
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assigned to the first order of presentation v/hile the
remaining subjects were assigned to the second order of

presentation.

Thus, this design consisted of between-subjects

factors of instructional condition and order of presentation.

The v/ithin-subjects factors included modality of the original
item, type of intervening item, and type of test item.

Procedure

During the presentation phase, subjects were presented 24

original items followed by 24 intervening items.
viewed each slide for 15 seconds.

Subjects

The slides were projected

onto a Technicolor rear screen projector by a Kodak Ecta

graphic slide projector (Model AF-3) with automatic timer.
Subjects in the shallov/ processing condition v/ere
instructed to perform a counting task.

V/hen a sentence v/as

presented, subjects were instructed to read the sentence and

count the number of words in the sentence.

v/hen a picture

was presented, subjects v;ere told to look at the picture and
count the number of different objects in the picture.
Subjects in the deep processing condition were instructed
to perform an imagery-induced pleasantness-rating task.

When

a sentence was presented, subjects were instructed to read

the sentence, form a color image of the scene described in
the sentence, and then rate the pleasantness of the sentence
on a three-point scale.

Similarly, v;hen a picture was

presented, the subjects were instructed to look at the
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picture, form a color image of the picture, and then rate the
pleasantness of the picture on a three-point scale.
Subjects in the intentional condition v/ere given
instructions to remember the information contained in the

slides.

V/hen a sentence was presented, subjects were told to

read the sentence and try to remember v;hat the sentence said

because it v/ould be important later on in the experiment.
I'/hen the subjects were presented v;ith a picture, they were
instructed to look at the picture and try to remember what

the picture looked like because it would be important later
on in the experiment.

The subjects were then given a recognition test.

Subjects v/ere instructed to classify each item as "old," one
which they had seen before, or "new," one v/hich they had not
seen before.

It should be noted that the subjects were

instructed to read aloud all sentences during the entire
experiment to ensure that the subjects were able to read and
comprehend the material.

Furthermore, the experimenter

recorded all of the subjects' ansv/ers on the response sheets.

RESULTS

The signal detection measure of d' scores v/as the
dependent variable of primary interest in this experiment.
The d* measure indicates the change in recognition sensitivity
in differentiating betv/een original items and changed test

items.

The rejection region for all of the analyses was p<.05.

In each instructional condition, cross-modality semantic

integration was tested by comparing the d' scores in the
irrelevant and relevant intervening items conditions.

If

semantic integration occurs, the value of d' should be higher
\7hen semantically irrelevant items intervene than when
semantically relevant items intervene.

Planned comparisons

of the values of d' in the relevant and irrelevant intervening
items conditions were used to test the prediction of semantic

integration.

As can be seen in Table 1, the d' scores v/ere

significantly higher with irrelevant than relevant intervening
items for the shallow processing task

processing task

deep

and the intentional processing

task it^^=9.77).
To examine more specific patterns of results, an overall

analysis of variance v;as performed on the d' data for the

three processing tasks.

V/ithin-subjects variables of modality

of the original item and the type of intervening item were
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Table a

Mean d' Data for Irrelevant and Relevant

Intervening Items as a Function
of Processing Task

Type of Intervening Item

Processing Task

Irrelevant

Relevant

Shallow

2.54

0.79

Deep

3.15

1.52

Intentional

3.27

1.56

19

also included.

As can be seen in Table 2, the effect of

original modality on d' v/as significant, F(1,42)=5.33,

MSg=12,ll.

Subjects' recognition sensitivity v/as greater

v/lien the original items v/ere sentences (d'=2.39) as compared
to pictures (d'=1.89).

Subjects' recognition sensitivity v/as

greater v/hen irrelevant (d'=2.99) items intervened than v/hen

relevant (d'=1.29) items intervened, F(1,42)=49.60, hS =138.69,
There v/as no significant effect for type of processing task,
and the effect of task did not interact v/ith the other

variables 'in the analysis.

-v^_Finally, as indicated in Table 2, there was a significant

Modality\x Intervening Item interaction, F(1,42)=11.88,
MS =31.47.N^ V/ith pictures, subjects v/ere more sensitive v/hen
irrelevant (d'\=3.14) than relevant (d'=0.63) items intervened.
Similarly/, v/ith\sentences, subjects v/ere more sensitive v/hen

irrelevant (d'=2.8^ "than relevant (d'=1.95) items intervened.
s

A posteriori comparisdKjs revealed that there was a significant
V

\

difference betv/een the d^'^^data in the irrelevant and relevant
•

v.

intervening items conditions for both pictures and sentences.
'x

Hov/ever, the difference in d' betv/^n the irrelevant and
relevant intervening items v/as great

when a picture v/as
'\
\

presented first than when a sentence was'^goresented first.
Collectively, these results indicate semantf^ integration
\

occurred in both the pictorial and verbal modal,i'ties,

Kov/

ever, there appears to be a greater degree of crdss-modality

semantic integration v/hen the original item presented v/as a

\
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Table 2

Analysis of Variance

Source

SS

df

F

Processing Task (T)

21.89

2

10.94

2.28

Order (0)

14.90

1

14.90

3.11

Original Ilodality (H)

12.11

1

12.11

5.33*

138.69

1

138.69

49.60*

T X 0

13.87

2

6.93

1.45

T X M

0.30

2

0.15

0.07

0 X M

0.44

1

0.44

0.19

T X I

0.12

2

0.06

0.02

0 X I

7.76

1

7.76

2.78

H X I

31.47

1

31.47

X 0 X I'l

1.72

2

0.89

0.39

T X 0 X I

4.18

2

2.09

0.75

T

X M X I

5.18

2

2.59

0.98

0 X U X I

0.44

1

0.44

0.17

T X 0 X I'l X I

0.89

2

0.44

0.17

201.13

42

4.79

SM(TO)

95.32

42

2.27

SI(TO)

117.43

42

2.80

SMI(TO)

111.31

42

2.65

Intervening Item (I)

T

S(TO)

*p<.05

11.88*
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picture than v/hen the original item presented was a sentence.

DISCUSSION

The nain purpose in Experiment 1 v/as to examine crossmodality semantic integration as a function of depth of
processing in third graders.

The principle predictions v/ere

that subjects v/ould semantically integrate significantly more
information v;ith the deep processing task than with the
shallov/ processing task.

Furthermore, it was postulated that

no integration would occur v/ith the intentional processing
task.

Results from this experiment do not support these

predictions.

VJhen irrelevant items intervened, subjects'

recognition sensitivity was significantly greater than when

relevant i'ntervening items intervened in the shallov/, deep,
and intentional processing tasks.

In addition, there were

no significant effects of depth of processing on recognition
sensitivity.

Thus, cross-modality semantic integration

occurred in all three processing conditions.

These findings suggest that, regardless of the type of
memory instructions the subjects received, they processed the

information in such a v/ay that cross-modality semantic
integration occurred.

However, this finding conflicts v/ith

the results obtained by Pezdek (Note 1).

In Pezdek's study,

there was no significant difference in the d' scores betv/een

the relevant (d'=2.07) and irrelevant (d'=2.19) intervening
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items conditions.

This indicates the third graders in her

study did not integrate relevant information presented in two
different modalities.

An explanation exists to account for the differences in
results obtained by Pesdek and the present study.

Subjects

in Pezdek's study were given 8 seconds to view each slide

during the presentation phase.

However, subjects in the

present study were given 15 seconds to view each slide during
the presentation phase.

This increase in presentation time

was due to the fact that the shallov/ and deep processing

tasks required more than 8 seconds to complete.

It is possible

that 8 seconds was not a sufficient amount of time for third

graders to adequately process the material presented to them
in order for semantic integration to occur.

The fact that

children integrated the information in all of the processing

conditions in the present study suggests that children

spontaneously integrate cross-modality information v/hen
given sufficient time to process the information in memory.
Therefore, a second experiment was conducted to determine if
amount of processing time has an effect upon the memory
processes in children, in particular, the process of semantic
integration.

EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 2 v/as conducted to test the hypothesis that

third graders process information in such a way that crossmodality semantic integration occurs when given 15 seconds to

view each slide during the presentation phase, but not when
given 3 seconds to view each slide.

This v/ould account for

the differences in integration results obtained in Experiment
1 in the present study and results reported by Pezdek (Note 1)►
Therefore, the same paradigm used in Experiment 1 was used in
this experiment.

All subjects received the intentional

processing instructions and they were only given 8 seconds to
view each slide during the presentation phase.

It is hypothesized that third graders are capable of

cross-modality semantic integration when given an adequate
amount of time to process the information presented to them.

V/hile 15 seconds per slide appears to be enough time to
process the information, it is hypothesized that 8 seconds

does not give third graders sufficient time to adequately
process the information presented to them.

Thus, it is

predicted that there v/ill be no significant difference in

recognition sensitivity when comparing the d' data from the
irrelevant and relevant intervening items conditions.

In

other words, it is predicted that cross-modality semantic
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integration v/ill not occur in the present experiment.

METHOD

Sub.jects

Sixteen third graders from Monterey Elementary School,

San Bernardino, California and Morgan Elementary School,
Rialto, California participated in this study.

Students

enrolled in remedial reading classes did not participate.
Procedure

The same design and materials used in Experiment 1 were

utilized in the present experiment.

During the presentation

phase, subjects v/ere presented 24 original items followed by
24 intervening items, and viewed each slide for 8 seconds.
The slides were projected onto a Technicolor rear screen

projector by a Kodak Ectagraphic slide projector (Model AF-3)
v/ith automatic timer.

Subjects v/ere given instructions to remember the

information presented in the slides.

V/hen a sentence was

presented, subjects were told to read the sentence aloud and
try to remember what the sentence said because it would be

important later in the experiment.

V/hen the subjects were

presented v/ith a picture, they v/ere instructed to look at the

picture and try to remember v/hat the picture looked like

because it would be important later in the experiment.
In the recognition test, subjects v/ere instructed to
26

2.1

classify each test item as either "old" or "new,"

Subjects

were required to read aloud all sentences during the entire
experiment to ensure they were able to read and comprehend
the material.

Furthermore, the experimenter recorded all of

the subjects' answers on the response sheets.

RESULTS

Once again, the signal detection measure of d' scores was

the dependent variable of primary interest.

To summarize,

the signal detection measure of d* indicates the change in
recognition sensitivity in discriminating between the

original and changed test items.

The rejection region for

all analyses was p<.05.
Semantic integration was tested by comparing the d' data
in the relevant and irrelevant intervening items conditions.
If integration occurs, the value of d' should be lower v/hen
semantically relevant items intervene than when semantically
irrelevant items intervene.

To determine whether semantic

integration occurred, a t-test for related samples was

utilized in comparing the values of d* in the relevant and
irrelevant intervening items conditions.

The results

indicated there v/as no significant difference betv/een the d'

scores in the relevant (d*=2.01) and irrelevant (d'=2.36)

intervening items conditions (t22_=0«9'7). A comparison of the
d' data in this experiment and the d' data for the intentional

condition in Experiment 1 is presented in Table 3.

In

comparison to the present experiment. Table 3 shows there was
a significant difference between the d' scores in the relevant

(d'=1.56) and irrelevant (d'=3.27) intervening items conditions
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in the intentional condition in Experiment 1 (t^2=9.77), as
predicted by the integration hypothesis.

Table 3

Mean d' Data for Irrelevant and Relevant Intervening
Items as a Function of Presentation Time
for Intentional Tasks

Type of Intervening Item

Presentation Time

Irrelevant

Relevant

8 seconds

2.36

2.01

15 seconds

3.27

1.56

m

DISCUSSION

This study predicted that cross-modality semantic

integration v/ould not occur v;hen the subjects v;ere given a
viev/ing time of 8 seconds per slide.

The present results

support this hypothesis and replicates the findings of Pezdek

(Note 1). In Experiment 1, subjects demonstrated the ability
to semantically integrate cross-modality information v/hen

given 15 seconds to viev/ each slide.

Collectively, these

results suggest that, in processing meaningful information in
tv/o different modalities, third graders integrate the
information in memory when given adequate time to do so.

Vlhile it v/as concluded by Pezdek that third graders did not
integrate cross-modality information in memory, it is now

apparent that these children can semantically integrate

information contained in pictures and sentences in memory.
Children in this age group merely need more time to process
the information in memory than they v/ere given in the Pezdek
study.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present study examined semantic integration of
information presented in sentences and pictures to third

graders.

Pezdek (Note 1) reported that third graders did not

integrate information presented in two different modalities.
Based on this finding, it was hypothesized that the children

in Pezdek's study had a production deficiency.

It was

suggested that integration did not occur because the children

were not processing the information at a deep enough level to

be av/are of the semiantic similarity betv/een items, despite
their formal differences in modality.
The results of this study, however, suggest that third
graders can semantically integrate cross-modality information.

As can be seen in Table 1 and Table 3, there was no evidence
of integration when children were given 8 seconds to view

each slide during the presentation phase; there v/as strong
evidence for integration when the viewing time was increased

to 15 seconds per slide.

In the 15 seconds viewing condition,

subjects' recognition sensitivity v/as greater when irrelevant

items intervened than when relevant items intervened,
regardless of the memory instructions the subjects received.

In the 8 seconds viewing condition, subjects' recognition
sensitivity v/as essentially the same in both the irrelevant
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and relevant intervening items conditions.

It should be

noted that, by definition, semantic integration occurs
spontaneously due to the nature of the memory processes.
Thus, it seems plausible to suggest that 8 seconds does not

allov/ children sufficient time to adequately process the
information presented to them.
did not occur.

Therefore, semantic integration

Hov/ever, since integration occurred when the

viewing time v/as increased to 15 seconds per slide, regardless
of the type of memory processing instructions the subjects'

received, it is suggested that this gave the children
sufficient time to process the information in memory, which,
in turn, allowed cross-modality semantic integration to occur
spontaneously.

Pezdek (Note 1) suggested that a possible explanation for
v/hy children did not integrate pictures and sentences in her
study was due to the fact that they had separate memory
stores for verbal and visual information.

This position had

been offered by other researchers (cf. Paivio & Csapo, 1959).
V/hile Pezdek did not have adequate data to sufficiently

address this issue, she rejected this hypothesis as

unparsimonious and theoretically implausible.

The fact

that cross-modality semantic integration occurred in the

present study lends support for the notion that children have
a single, integrated memory store for verbal and visual
information rather than a dual-coding system that stores
verbal and visual information in separate memory stores.
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The significant main effects of modality of original
items and relevancy of intervening items, along \^±th the
Modality x Intervening Items interaction need to be examined.

Basically, subjects' recognition sensitivity v;as greater for
sentences than pictures and greater when irrelevant items

intervened than when relevant items intervened.

Furthermore,

there v/as a greater degree of integration when the original
item was a picture rather than a sentence.

Hence, subjects

were more likely to integrate relevant intervening sentences
into original pictures than they v/ere to integrate relevant

intervening pictures into original sentences.

This pattern

of results is consistent with the results reported by Pezdek

(Note 1).

Pezdek offers a plausible explanation for these

findings.

Basically she' suggested that more information was

contained in the pictures than in the sentences.

Thus, in

the verbal condition, a relevant intervening picture contained

more inform.ation than the original sentence and, therefore,

was seen as different from the original sentence.
the sentence and picture v/ere stroed separately.

Consequently,
As a result,

the relevant items v/ould not be integrated, and at the same
time the original sentence v/ould be better recognized.
Hov/ever, in the pictorial condition the relevant intervening
sentences contained less information than the original
pictures.

Therefore, the sentences could be integrated into

the stored representations of the pictures without losing
much information.
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In conclusion, Pezdek reported that older children and
young adults integrated cross-modality information while
young children and elderly adults did not.

V/liile it v/as

first postulated that young children v/ere probably approaching
the experimental situation v/ith a production deficiency, the
present study indicates that this was not the case.

Instead,

the children appear to need more time than adults to process
the information in memory in order for semantic integration
to occur,

V/hile semantic integration occurs with adults when

given a viev/ing time of 8 seconds per slide, young children
need a viewing time of 15 seconds per slide in order for

integration to occur.

Thus, the children in Pezdek's (Note 1)

study were not operating with a production deficiency; adults

merely process information in memory (and therefore integrate
it) faster than children do.

Based on this finding, further

research should be conducted to determine v/hether the elderly
adults in Pezdek's study were unable to integrate cross-

modality information due to a production deficiency, a
mediational deficiency, or insufficient time to process the
information in memory.

APPENDIX 1

VERBAL SET STIMULI

1.) S
IP

The woman came into the chapel.
Tv/o boys jumping over a fence.

The woman came into the chapel.
2.) S
IP

The boys paddled past the breaking waves.
A boy and girl playing in the sand.
The boys paddled past the breaking waves.

3.) S

1

The child played with his new toy.

I
IP

Two girls sitting at a table with drinks.

S

The child played with his new toy.

4.) S

1

IP

The bug moved across the wall.

A boy and girl dancing in a room.
The spider moved across the v/all.

5.) S

1

IP

The lantern lit up the room.
Two boys digging a hole with shovels.

The lantern lit up the cabin.
6.) S

1

The girl enjoyed playing the sport.

i:
IP

A skyscraper surrounded by many buildings.

s

The girl enjoyed playing tennis.

7.) S

The people looked at the bridge.

1

HP

People looking at a covered bridge.
The people looked at the bridge.

8.) S

1

RP

The stream ran below the house.

A cabin next to a stream in the woods.
The stream ran below the house.
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9.) S
1

RP

The flowers were in the middle of the table.

Daisies in a vase in the middle of a table.
The flowers v/ere in the middle of the table.

10.) S

1

RP

The man presented an enjoyable concert.
A pianist performing in front of an audience.

The pianist presented an enjoyable concert.
11.) S

1

RP

The cook put the pan on the kitchen counter.

A cook setting a frying pan on a kitchen counter.
The cook put the frying pan on the kitchen counter.

12.) S

1

HP

The bird was perched atop the tree.

An eagle perched at the top of a tree.
The eagle was at the top of the tree.

APPENDIX 2

PICTORIAL SET STIMULI

1.) P 1
IS

Several books sitting on a table.
The cat was curled up on the rocker.
Several books sitting on a table.

2.) P

1

IS

A lady's hand with several rings on her fingers.
The bright winter sun came in the window.

A lady's hand with several rings on her fingers.
3.) P

1

IS
1

4.) P

1

IS

A lady standing in front of a house.

The birds sang happily in the cage.
A lady standing in front of a house.

A modern house surrounded by bushes.
Papers blew off of the desk.

A modern house surrounded by flowers.
5.) P

1

IS

Two dogs playing with a bone.
The woman rode off on her bicycle.
Two dogs playing with a ball.

6.) P

1

IS

A violin leaning against a chair.

The caddy follov/ed the golf ball.
A violin leaning against a box.

7.) P

1

RS

A man in a suit with a turtleneck shirt.
The man in the suit had on a dark tie.
A man in a suit v/ith a turtleneck shirt.

8.) P

1

RS

A courthouse with a flag on the roof.

The flag was on the pole next to the big building.
A courthouse v/ith a flag on the roof.
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9.) P

1

RS

A car parked next to a tree.

The car by the tree had ski-racks on it.
A car parked next to a tree.

10.) P

1

RS

A round clock on the wall next to a fireplace.
The cuckoo clock v/as next to the fireplace.
A cuckoo clock on the wall next to a fireplace.

11.) P1
RS

A boy and girl walking with their arras around each other.
The boy and girl held hands as they v/alked.

A boy and girl holding hands as they are v/alking.
12.) p

1

RS

Boys and girls talking to a mailman.
The little boys talked v/ith the mailman.
Boys talking to a mailman.

REFERENCE NOTE

1, Pezdek, K.

Life-span differences in semantic integration

of pictures and sentences in memory.
for publication, 1979.
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